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
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Arab States - Israel: Jarring's efforts have received yet another serious setback.

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ARAB STATES - ISRAEL: UN SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE JARRING'S EFFORTS TO REACH AN ARAB-ISRAELI SETTLEMENT HAVE SUFFERED YET ANOTHER SERIOUS SETBACK.

THE EGYPTIAN AND JORDANIAN FOREIGN MINISTERS HAVE LEFT NEW YORK.

THEY SEE NO FORWARD MOVEMENT IN ISRAELI FOREIGN MINISTER EBAN'S LATEST PROPOSALS TO JARRING AND MAINTAIN THAT UNTIL ISRAEL MAKES SOME SPECIFIC COMMITMENT ON THE CRUCIAL ISSUE OF WITHDRAWAL FROM THE OCCUPIED ARAB TERRITORIES, THEY SEE NO POINT IN REMAINING. THEY BOTH INSIST THEY WANT THE JARRING MISSION TO CONTINUE AND HAVE TOLD JARRING THEY WILL MAINTAIN CONTACT WITH HIM. THEY MADE NO MENTION OF ANY RECOURSE TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL.

EGYPTIAN FOREIGN MINISTER RIYAD SAID THAT THE EBAN DOCUMENT MADE IT CLEAR THAT THE ISRAELI CABINET HAD MADE NO DECISION ON WITHDRAWAL. RIYAD SAID WITHDRAWAL WAS ESSENTIAL TO A SETTLEMENT, ADDING THAT CAIRO COULD NEVER SIGN ANYTHING THAT RESULTED IN THE ACQUISITION OF ARAB TERRITORY BY ISRAEL. JORDANIAN FOREIGN MINISTER RIFAI SAID THE EBAN DOCUMENT WAS "EVEN WORSE THAN EXPECTED."

THE ISRAELIS HAVE BEEN ACTIVELY TRYING TO PORTRAY EBAN'S MEMORANDUM AS FORWARD LOOKING AND CONSTITUTING ENOUGH "TO KEEP THE BALL ROLLING." EBAN'S PAPER

ASKS A SERIES OF QUESTIONS ABOUT EGYPT'S ATTITUDE TOWARD VARIOUS ASPECTS OF A PEACE SETTLEMENT. EBAN GAVE NO SPECIFICS ON A TERRITORIAL SETTLEMENT WITH EGYPT, EXCEPT TO MENTION THAT WHEN "SECURE AND RECOGNIZED BOUNDARIES" WERE DISCUSSED, ISRAEL WOULD DEMAND SPECIAL PROVISIONS ENSURING ISRAELI ACCESS TO THE GULF OF AQABA.

JARRING FOUND THE EBAN DOCUMENT BETTER IN TONE BUT SAW NO REAL ADVANCE. HE HAS TOLD US OFFICIALS HE INTENDS TO CONTINUE HIS MISSION. HE EXPRESSED

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THE VIEW THAT THERE WOULD NOW BE A PROTRACTED DELAY IN POLITICAL PROGRESS, AND FEARED THE AREA WOULD DRIFT INTO VERY DESTRUCTIVE MILITARY CLASHES.

ACCORDING TO RIFAI, SOVIET OFFICIALS IN BOTH NEW YORK AND CAIRO WERE URGING THE ARABS TO CONTINUE COOPERATING WITH JARRING, AND HAD URGED BOTH RIFAI AND RIYAD TO STAY ON IN NEW YORK. [REDACTED]

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